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women. Cases in point are divorce, contraception, and abortion (which 
in their effects, to say nothing of their nature, are disproportionately 
damaging to women). Nussbaum appeals to the words of John Paul II to 
support her views about freedom but she ignores his words about the 
evils of divorce, contraception, and abortion. In fact, in the case of con-
traception, she wants to stop the Pope and religious authorities general-
ly from publicly speaking out against it. For contraception, she says, is a 
basic human right for women and any religious leader who speaks in 
public fora against it should be criticized as a "subverter of the constitu-
tion" (she does not say this about those who speak against abortion, but 
only, it seems, because some third world feminists speak against it). 
Nussbaum seems almost to be biting her tongue when she writes thus. 
From the general tone of her remarks one might rather think she was 
about to preach an anti-religious crusade or jihad. 
Most of the essayists in this collection go after Rawls and / or Audi. 
Nussbaum is left untouched, which is curious for she is more open and 
up-front about what secular liberalism entails in practice than either of 
them. She makes it more explicit that secular liberalism is both a com-
prehensive doctrine and a novel doctrine, and a doctrine moreover that 
is going to oppress religion and the religious whenever it feels itself 
strong enough to do so. She makes it clearer, therefore, that secular liber-
als are the enemies of liberty that George Washington warned us against 
in his Farewell Address. Fortunately for the vast majority of Americans 
secular liberals are a minority voice in the country, and indeed in acade-
mia too. But this book is a timely reminder of the threat they pose. In 
this, as in other respects, it is a welcome contribution to the important 
discussion now going on about freedom and religion, about their rela-
tions and interdependence. 
Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body 
Problem. David Ray Griffin. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
California University Press, 1998. Pp. xv and 266. $45.00 (Cloth). 
LEEMON McHENRY, Loyola Marymount University 
Ever since Descartes failed to answer the persistent but insightful ques-
tions of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia as to how the mind and body 
interact in the pineal gland of the brain, philosophy has been left with 
what Schopenhauer called the "world-knot," arguably the problem of 
modern philosophy. The sophistication of neuroscience and computer 
models of the brain in the past twenty-five years has certainly stimulat-
ed interest in the problem, but emerging scientific orthodoxy has been 
one-sided. Physicalistic materialism appears to be the only serious alter-
native to Cartesian dualism mainly because, according to Griffin, it is the 
paradigm of both wishful and fearful thinking: "wishful" to the extent 
that we believe what we want to be true-in this case, that all phenome-
na in the universe will be explained finally by materialistic laws; "fear-
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ful" in the sense that we reject a priori what threatens the paradigm-in 
this case, that the reality of consciousness presents a terrifying prospect 
for the final truth of materialism. To Griffin, however, the "world-knot" 
has only tightened around the neck of materialism and substance dual-
ism, both of which, he argues, present insuperable difficulties. He there-
fore boldly proposes a form of panpsychism-panexperimentalist physi-
cialism-as the neglected solution that has eluded contemporary discus-
sions. 
The long and patient labor of unsnarling the knot begins with 
Griffin's chapters devoted to common sense, regulative principles, data, 
and a detailed analysis of the difficulties of materialism and dualism. 
Although he discusses the problems unique to materialism and dualism 
respectively, Griffin's focus is on the problems that they share, because 
"the naturalistic materialism of late modernity simply eliminated God 
and the nonphysical soul from the dualistic supernaturalism of early 
modernity, leaving intact its view of nature as insentient matter." (p. 77) 
But even the radical forms of materialism implicitly affirm a universe of 
two sorts of things: experiencing and nonexperiencing. In what follows, 
I will devote my attention to a few of the problems Griffin identifies as 
the common root of materialism and dualism, as they lead logically to 
the panexperimentalist solution. 
(1) Given the continuity suggested by evolution, the line drawn 
between experiencing and non experiencing entities is arbitrary. 
Descartes had this problem when he distinguished between human 
souls and the rest of insentient nature. Now the debate continues up 
and down the phylogenetic tree with no clear answer. 
(2) Despite the advance of neuroscience and the rejection of all "folk 
psychological" explanations, conscious experience is not explicable in 
physicalistic terms. Consciousness therefore remains the Great Exception 
in need of reconciliation within the paradigm. Materialists have high 
expectations that the properties expressed by psychological predicates 
will turn out to be physical, but this appears unlikely. 
(3) Most importantly, materialism and dualism cannot explain with-
out an explicit or at least implicit supernaturalism how experience arose 
out of nonexperiencing actualities. As William James realized, con-
sciousness, however little, is an "illegitimate birth" in any view that pro-
fesses to explain all the facts by continuous evolution. The emergence of 
subjectivity, of what it is like to have an "inside," is not the emergence of 
one more objective property or externalistic feature. Consciousness is 
not a property that appears for others but rather what it is to be an expe-
rience for itself. 
Griffin argues that panexperimentalism not only addresses these 
problems head on but offers the most intelligible solutions to them. The 
first task before him is to construct a view of the "inside" and the "out-
side," introspection and perception, mind and matter, in such a way that 
dualisms are broken down by demonstrating how they share common 
characteristics. For example, the view that mind is subjective, temporal, 
and unextended while matter is objective, spatial and extended is col-
lapsed into one ontological category of entities conceived as spatio-tem-
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poral units of rudimentary sentience, which are first subjective, then 
objective. Such units are understood to be events rather than mental and 
physical substances. 
This ontology paves the way for understanding how mind and matter 
arise from essentially the same stuff. The question: "How does con-
scious experience arise from insentient neurons?" is reformulated: 
"How does conscious experience arise from basic entities that are them-
selves comprised of experience?" In this manner, Griffin focuses atten-
tion on what he calls "nonsensuous perception," examples for which 
include the experience of the unity arising from the totality of bodily 
experience and the sense of having just emerged from our own immedi-
ate past. In other words, our bodily experience is taken to be the closest 
direct observation of the workings of nature. We understand nature by 
generalizing from how it works in ourselves. (p. 142) Consciousness, 
however, is not basic in this scheme of thought; rather it emerges in 
degrees of complexity from a rudimentary sentience that pervades the 
whole of nature. 
Throughout Griffin's book he carefully analyzes much of the contem-
porary literature on the mind-body problem, including the work of 
Thomas Nagel, John Searle, Galen Strawson, Colin McGinn, Geoffrey 
Madell, Karl Popper, and Jaegwon Kim. It is, however, clear that the 
main inspiration for his own position is derived from the metaphysics of 
Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Griffin is well aware 
that the analytic mainstream has not only neglected these thinkers but is 
largely contemptuous of them. (p. 115) He is therefore in the difficult 
position of explaining the "radical" hypothesis needed to break the 
stalemate in the current mind-body debate, but by doing so in terms of a 
system of thought vastly alien and perhaps utterly unintelligible to his 
audience. 
Although Griffin has taken considerable pains to cover the literature 
of his opposition, he misses the opportunity to strengthen his position 
by rallying support from his allies. British philosopher Timothy 
Sprigge, for example, has been the most vigorous proponent of panpsy-
chism today, and specifically for the very reason of providing an intelli-
gible solution to the mind-body problem.! Griffin does discuss William 
James's views briefly, but this is overshadowed by his focus on the 
details of Whitehead's system, which, he argues, is the strongest form of 
panpsychism. 
Despite the thoroughness and rigor of Griffin's analysis of the prob-
lem and his solution, there are, I think, a few difficulties. First, some 
progress has been made in bio-chemistry in explaining how organic 
compounds emerge under primitive conditions. In particular, the 
Miller-Urey experiment demonstrated how amino acids, the building 
blocks of protein, are synthesized from more basic chemical 
compounds.2 Given this limited success, many biologists have speculat-
ed that the links in explaining the emergence of life and consciousness 
are within our grasp even if the evolutionary "scaffolds" are no longer 
in place to understand just exactly how the emergence occurred. The 
experimental work here provides a considerable amount of support to 
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the materialist paradigm, at least with regard to the probJem of continu-
ity between the inorganic and the organic. Griffin might have strength-
ened his thesis by discussing and offering his reasons for rejecting the 
current work in theoretical biology. 
Second, for most of us the panexperimentalist solution is so radical 
that it is hard to imagine what kind of sentience is spread throughout 
the universe. For example, it is much easier to think of such conditions 
arising on Earth, but what about the sentience that forms the basis of the 
nuclear-fusion reactions of the sun, the magma of volcanic eruptions or 
the vast regions of empty space? In this connection, I doubt many will 
be persuaded by Griffin's insistence on the distinction between true 
individuals and aggregational composites of such individuals. 
Panpsychism (in its various forms) has always been an interesting 
hypothesis, if not somewhat exotic and fantastical. To many this will be 
its central weakness, namely, the plausibility factor and the obstacle that 
it is a theory more suited to romantic idealism rather than serious sci-
ence or philosophy. 
As a fellow traveller in this territory, these are some of the lingering 
doubts that have prevented me from embracing panpsychism with open 
arms. In my view, however, Griffin does an excellent job of demonstrat-
ing that the reigning physicalistic materialism and dualism are even 
more implausible than panpsychism. The materialist story just doesn't 
quite add up in the end. 
For the reader who is convinced that dualism is a dead-end solution 
to the debate or simply tired of the arid and colorless discussions of 
materialism, this work offers refreshing novelty. Griffin's book deserves 
serious attention in order to provide a much-needed perspective and 
balance to the mind-body debate. 
NOTES 
1. See especially, Chapter 3 "The Vindication of Panpsychism," The 
Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1983). 
2. See John L. Casti's discussion of the different biological theories for 
how life aros~ from natural, physical processes. Chapter 2 U A Warm Little 
Pond," Paradigms Lost (New York: Avon Books, 1989). 
Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion by Robin 
Le Poidevin. Routledge, 1996. Pp. xxvii, 159. 
ANDREW ESHLEMAN, University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
This book is primarily a text, but, as the title indicates, Le Poidevin also 
makes a case for atheism. After sketching the contents of the book, I will 
make some general comments about the author's argument for atheism 
and discuss his contention that Western religion can survive the rejec-
tion of those metaphysical beliefs traditionally associated with theism. I 
